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Abstract 
 
Judgement aggregation has been receiving increasing attention over recent years. 
Some typical impossibility results have been proved, about majority and other 
similar aggregation methods. Those results depend essentially on certain logical 
constraints borrowed from standard two-valued deductive logic. Nevertheless, the 
adequacy of these constraints is doubtful. In this paper, we show that by 
weakening the consistency conditions in a plausible way, such impossibility 
theorems can be reversed. We also show that the formalism habitually employed 
in social choice theory may convey a richer setting for analysing this sort of 
aggregation.    
 
Key Words  : Judgement aggregation, majority method, logical constraints on 
judgment aggregation, discursive dilemma.  
  
JEL Codes: D7, D70, D71. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Professor at the  Department of Economic Analysis: Theory and History. Universidad Autónoma de 
Madrid, Ciudad Universitaria de Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain. 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
It is known that, in aggregating preferences, the majority method can lead to 
perplexing phenomena such as the voting paradox, also known as Condorcet’s paradox. 
More recently, in the growing literature on judgment aggregation inspired by the 
discursive dilemma2 and by the pioneering work of Philip Pettit (2001) and Christian 
List and Philip Pettit (2002), it has been pointed out that the majority method and other 
similar aggregation procedures may lead to basic logical inconsistencies. With these 
methods thus disqualified, other procedures are proposed, even though such procedures 
may attach to the group judgments that a majority of its members reject. 
 
We suggest in this paper that the apparent logical inconsistencies may arise because the 
logical restrictions imposed on collective judgments may be too strong. In the above-
mentioned literature and in this paper as well, collective logical rationality is understood 
by analogy to individual logical rationality. However, we suggest that the right analogy 
for any group which lacks a unanimous point of view is that of an individual who is not 
certain about his judgments and beliefs, rather than that of a person completely certain 
on his position. Collective unanimity would be analogous to individual certainty, while 
lack of unanimity would correspond at the individual level to lack of certainty. If this 
suggestion is accepted, then it would follow that the logical restrictions required from 
collective judgments should be weaker than those1 postulated habitually in the 
literature.  
 
In addition, we propose certain weaker logical restrictions that are met by the majority 
method and its variants. Therefore, the main aim of the paper is to recover the majority 
method and its variants for aggrega ting judgments when available information about the 
individual points of view is of a qualitative nature.    
 
                                                 
2 Table 4.1 in section 4 shows a version of the dilemma. 
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The paper assumes a relational framework for representing judgments that is more 
general than the usual framework on judgment aggregation and is more familiar in 
social choice theory. 3 This relational setting up allows us to point to certain ambiguities 
in the habitual framework and conveys some additional outcomes, for instance the 
coincidence of the majority method under certain circumstances with the procedure 
based on attaching with each collective judgment the difference between the number of 
the group’s members who accept it and the number of the group’s members who reject 
it. As a consequence, the majority method generates under such circumstances a 
transitive aggregate relation, and the voting paradox and similar difficulties disappear. 
 
In section 2 and 3, judgment relations, judgment aggregation functions and some 
variants of the majority method are introduced, and some well-known properties of 
those variants are enumerated. Section 4 focuses on the impossibility theorem presented 
by List and Pettit (2002). Doing so exemplifies these kind of results, the role that  
habitual logical constraints play in them, and the way that the majority method and its 
variants are disqualified as judgment aggregation procedures. In section 5 and 6, weaker 
logical constraints are introduced and it is shown that the majority method and its 
variants hold for them. This circumstance and some other considerations are commented 
on for justifying the proposed weaker logical restrictions. Section 7 points to the 
possibility of simplifying the way aggregation is set up in cases such as the discursive 
dilemma, where aggregation concerns arguments and conclusions. Section 8 presents a 
summary.  
 
2.- BASIC NOTIONS 
 
.- Agenda and language. 4 
 
N= {1, 2, ... , n} (n ³ 2) is a (finite) group of individuals. Each individual may make a 
judgement on each of a set of propositions, p, q, r, s,….. This set is called the “agenda” 
                                                 
 
3 List and Pettit (2006b) compare both frameworks, that of preference aggregation and that of judgment 
aggregation.  
 
4 As far as possible, we try to use the same notions and the same notation as Dietrich (2006).  
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and is denoted by G. Aggregating the judgments made by the individuals obtains 
judgements that can be considered the group’s collective judgments. 
  
Following Dietrich (2006: 287-8) in the basic logical notions, let “the set of all 
propositions” L (i.e. the language) be the (smallest) set such that  
-  L contains a set of atomic (non-descomposable) propositions, 
- if L contains p and q, then L also contains the negation of both (Øp, Øq) and every 
proposition obtained by linking p and q by means of any of the four diadic logical 
functors (Ù  “and”, Ú  “or”, ® “if, then” and « “if and only if”, or in short “iff”). 
 
Given L, the agenda G is a non-empty subset of L, which contains no double-negated 
propositions (ØØ p), and such that for every pÎG, also ~pÎG, where ~p =Ø p if p is 
not itself a negated proposition, and ~p =q if p is the negated proposition Øq. We 
refer to ~p as the complementary proposition of p , and to the latter one as the 
complementary proposition of the former. 
 
A truth-value assignment is a function assigning the value “true” or “false” (or “0” and 
“1”) to each proposition in L, in the standard way. 5 For every SÍ L, S is (logically) 
consistent (resp. inconsistent) if there exists a (resp. no) truth-value assignment that 
assigns “true” to each rÎS; for every p ÎL, S (logically) entails p, if  SÈ{~p} is 
inconsistent; it follows that for every pair p, qÎL, p (logically) entails q, if {p, ~q} is 
inconsistent. 
 
The agenda G is habitually assumed to contain at least two distintct and independent 
propositions, p¹ q, and their negations, Øp and Øq, where “independent” means that 
none of them implies the other proposition nor its complementary one. For simplicity, 
let us assume also that for some pair of independent propositions p, qÎG, the agenda 
contains their conjunction (pÙ  q) (and its negation Ø(pÙ  q)). 
 
 
                                                 
 
5 For any p, qÎL, Øp is true iff p is false; (pÙq) is true iff both p and q are true; (pÚq) is true iff p is true 
or q is true; (p®q) is true iff p is false or q is true; ; (p«q) is true iff  p and q are both true, or both are 
false. 
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.- Judgment relationships. 
 
A judgment relationship is a binary relation R defined in an agenda G; “pRq” means that 
proposition p is accepted (by some person or by the group) as firmly, at least, as q is.  
 
We define relations P and I as usually: for every p, qÎG, 
- pPq, iff,  pRq and not qRp ; 
- pIq, iff,  pRq and qRp. 
 
The expresion “pPq” means that proposition p is more firmly accepted (by some person 
or by the group) than q; when q= ~p, “pPq” means that p is accepted and q is rejected. 
The expression “pIq” means that proposition p is equally firmly accepted (by some 
person or by the group) as q. 
 
Judgment relationships may hold the usual relational properties. For instance, R is  
- reflexive iff for every pÎG, pRp; 
- weakly connected iff for every p, qÎG, p¹q, pRq o qRp ; 
- strongly connected or complete iff for every p, qÎG, pRq o qRp; 
- transitive iff  for every p, q, rÎG, pRq and qRr, then pRr; 
- a complete preordering iff it is (strongly) complete and transitive. 
 
The above definitional conditions imply that I is reflexive (for every pÎG, pIp) and 
symmetrical (for every p, qÎG, if pIq then qIp). Relation P, on the contrary,  
is asymmetrical (for every p, qÎG, if pPq then ØqPp).  
 
Properties focusing on the relations between complementary propositions may be 
relevant, as for instance: 
 
- Vertical or complementary completeness: for every pÎG, pR~p or ~pRp. 
 
- Vertical restriction: judgment relation R is vertically restricted iff for every p, qÎG 
such that pRq or qRp,  q=~p (and p=~q). 
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Since judgment relations compare propositions, they may hold properties of a logical 
character. For instance, the definition of P implies these two versions of the non-
contradiction principle:  
 
- Restricted non-contradiction principle: for every pÎG, it cannot be that  pP~p and 
also ~pPp. 
- General non-contradiction principle: for every pÎG, it cannot be that pP~p and also 
~pRp. 
 
Similarly, tertio excluso is the name of another basic principle of two-valued standard 
logic:  
 
- Tertio excluso principle: for every pÎG, if pR~p or ~pRp, then pP~p or ~pPp. 
 
A judgment on the question raised by proposition p may take one of the following 
mutually exclusive forms: pPØp, pIØp and ØpPp. If the tertio excluso principle holds, 
then the second option is excluded. 
 
Other properties concerning relationships between non-complementary propositions, 
like the following basic one, may be also relevant:  
 
- Vertical or complementary balance: for every p, qÎG, pRq iff ~qR~p. 
 
If R is transitive, then vertical or complementary balance entails basic coherence 
properties such as these: 
 
(a) if pP~p and qR~q, then pP~q and qP~p; 
 (b) if pP~p and qI~q, then pPq; 
 (c) if pI~p and qI~q, then pIq and ~pI~q.6 
                                                 
 
6 For (a): Imagine that, on the contrary, ~qRp or ~pRq. If ~qRp, complementary balance entails that 
~pPq; by transitivity, ~qRq, contradicting the hypothesis. Analogously, it follows from ~pRq that ~pPp. 
For (b): Note that if qPp, then qI~q; and that if pIq then pI~p. 
(c) follows from similar arguments. 
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As will be clear below, the following property is also relevant for the purposes of this 
paper: 
 
- Levelling: for every p, qÎG, if pP~p and qP~q, then pIq and ~pI~q. 
  
Several additional properties of a logical nature are considered in next sections. 
 
.- Judgment relationships aggregation functions. 
 
We will focus on aggregating sets of individual judgments and model these sets as 
binary relations. An aggregation procedure starts from a set of individuals’s points of 
view represented by the corresponding judgment relations (one for each person of the 
group), and gives as output a collective point of view also represented as a binary 
aggregate relation. 
 
Formally, a profile of individual judgment relations f= (R1,…, Rn) is a n-tuple of 
judgement relations where Ri denotes the point of view or judgment relation of 
individual i. A (relational) judgment aggregation function F is a function f= (R1,…, Rn) 
that assigns a judgment relationship (namely, the aggregate judgment relationship) to 
each profile of individual judgment relationships in its domain, in symbols, to each f= 
(R1,…, Rn)ÎDom(F). 7 Dom (F) denotes the domain of F, i. e. the set of all profiles of 
individual judgments relationships that are considered as admissible. As far as judgment 
aggregation procedures and functions are concerned, this paper focus on the majority 
method and on some related aggregation mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
7 There are also judgment aggregation functions of a quantitative (non-relational) kind. For these, see for 
instance Dietrich (2006).  
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3.- AGGREGATING JUDGMENTS BY MEANS OF THE MAJORITY 
METHOD AND SIMILAR PROCEDURES. 
.- Categorical judgment relations.8 
 
As List and Pettit (2002: 90) remark, judgments are ‘modelled on acts of assent or 
dissent, assertion or denial, and differ from credences in not allowing degrees of 
confidence’. Hence, judgments are frequently modelled at the individual level as 
(categorical) truth valuations of the propositions in the agenda made by each of the 
persons of the group. Analogously, judgments are also modelled at the aggregate level 
as collective or aggregate truth valuations of these same propositions. Alternatively, 
aggregation may start from the set of choices made by each individua l between each 
proposition in the agenda and its complementary proposition, arriving at a correponding 
set of choices supposedly made by the group or simply attributed to it (see Dietrich 
2006). In any case, such favorable truth valuations and choices are interpreted as 
acceptance of the propositions concerned, and as rejection of the negatively valuated or 
non chosen propositions. 
 
When trying to formalize such judgments by means of binary relations, they may be 
modelized in two alternative ways. First, individual judgment relations may be 
conceived as complete, vertically balanced and levelled preorderings that satisfy the 
tertio excluso principle. Such relations represent the world of standard (categorical 
deductive) logic, and contain only categorical judgments about the truth and falsehood 
of the propositions in the agenda.  
 
Aggregation procedures considered may also be interpreted in another way. It may be 
contended, for instance, that truth-valuation does not presuppose nor imply that any two 
true (or any two false) propositions are at the same “level”. It may also be contended 
that,  in many cases, it is only possible to get yes or no answers for questions of 
acceptance or rejection of judgments, independently of how certain people themselves 
feel about their answers. For these and other reasons, individual judgments expressed by 
truth values may also be represented by vertically complete and vertically restricted 
                                                 
8 According to my use of the word “categorical”, a categorical judgment is a judgment made or stated 
‘with certainty and firmness’ (cf. Collins Cobuild English Dictionary. London, Harper Collins Publishers, 
1995).  
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relations. We assume that, like categorical relations, these relations also meet the tertio 
excluso principle.  
 
According to the habitual model of judgment aggregation, individuals follow standard 
logical constraints (List and Pettit (2002: 90); Dietrich (2006: 288)). In our framework, 
relations satisfying one of the following two logical properties can represent this type of 
behaviour:  
 
- Set-wise (logical) deductive closure: for every SÍG and every pÎG, if S (logically) 
entails ~p, then (1) if every sÎ S, sP~s then ~pPp, and (2) if every sÎ S, sR~s, then 
~pRp.9 
 
- Set-wise deductive transfer: for every SÍG and every pÎG, if S logically entails p, 
then it cannot happen that for every qÎS, qPp. 
 
It is easy to check that if R is transitive, complete, and vertically balanced, then set-wise 
deductive transfer implies set-wise (logical) deductive closure.10 Analogously, if R is 
transitive, complete, vertically balanced and levelled, then set-wise deductive closure  
implies set-wise deductive transfer.11 
 
Let us call “levelled relations of categorical judgment” all complete, vertically balanced 
and levelled preorderings defined on G that satisfy the tertio excluso principle, set-wise 
deductive transfer and, therefore, set-wise deductive closure, and let A be the set of all 
such judgment relations. The corresponding universal domain for aggregation is the set 
of all profiles of such relations, that is, the set An. 
 
                                                 
 
9 This is the same property postulated by List and Pettit (2002), enlarged for allowing that sI~s. 
 
10 If S logically entails p, for set-wise deductive transfer it cannot happen that for every sÎS, sPp. Then, 
for completeness, there is some sÎS such that pRs and, for vertical balance, ~sR~p. Then, for transitivity , 
if every sÎ S, sR~s, then pR~p, and if for every sÎ S, sP~s, then pP~p. 
 
11 Suppose that, on the contrary, S logically entails p and for every qÎS, qPp. Then, by levelling, for every  
qÎS, qR~q, and for set-wise deductive closure, pR~p. Then, given that for every qÎS, qPp, and it would 
not be possible that for every qÎS, qI~q. Then for some qÎS, qP~q. But even then, it cannot be that for 
every qÎS, qPp. 
 11 
Analogously, let us call “segmented relation of categorical judgments” any vertically 
complete and vertically restricted relation defined on G, that also meet the tertio excluso 
principle and set-wise deductive closure, and let B be the set of all of them. The 
corresponding universal domain for aggregation is the set of all profiles of such 
relations, that is, the set Bn. It should be noted that set-wise deductive transfer lacks 
meaning in regard to judgment relations of this sort. 
 
List and Pettit (2002: 97; 2006: ) postulate about three habitual logical constraints: 
completeness, consistency, and deductive closure. The first of these three constraints 
corresponds, in our terminology, to vertical completeness. The second corresponds to 
the restricted non-contradiction principle. The third could be translated by the 
following formulation: for every set SÍG and every pÎG, if set S logically entails p, 
and if for every qÎ S it happens that qP~q, then pP~p. Therefore, if R is vertically 
complete, then set-wise deductive closure entails deductive closure. In addition, if R is 
transitive, complete, and vertically balanced, then set-wise deductive transfer implies 
(set-wise (logical) deductive closure) and deductive closure. 
 
.- Adapting the majority method. 
 
Given that acceptance and rejection are understood as acts that do not allow degrees, 
and given that the aggregation method is not applied to binary relations, as is the usual 
case in social choice theory, the way the majority method is habitually understood and 
applied to judgment aggregation may differ slightly from the usual understanding of this 
method in social choice theory.  
 
It is also habitually presupposed that the aggregation output has to be, for every 
individual profile, a judgment relation of the same sort as individual judgment relations. 
That means that if individual points of view are modelled as categorical judgment 
levelled relations, the aggregate or collective point of view should also be a categorical 
judgment levelled relation. If on the contrary, individual points of view are represented 
as categorical judgment segmented relations, the aggregate or collective point of view 
should be a relation of this same kind. It is habitually also assumed that the tertio 
excluso principle holds at both levels, individual and aggregate. Judgment acceptance 
and rejection are understood at the aggregate level, as well, as acts that do not allow 
 12 
degrees. This assumption induces a curious circumstance: the majority method is not an 
appropriate aggregation procedure when there are ties.  
 
In any case, the majority method  (MMD) can be defined as the judgment relational 
aggregation function F that asigns to every profile of individual judgment relations f= 
=(R1,…, Rn) in its domain the aggregate relation RJ such that for every two propositions 
p and q in the agenda, pRJq iff ïN(p,q),fï³ïN (q,p),fï, where ïN (r,s), fï is the number of 
individuals i for which rPis.  
 
Even when individual judgment relations are levelled, as well as when they are 
segmented, the majority method has to be adapted. In the latter case, because the only 
propositions compared under the individual segmented relations are complementary 
propositions. Imagine that the majority method is applied to the pair formed by two 
propositions p and q that are not complementary. Then, ïN(p,q),fï=ïN (q,p),fï=0 and  pIJq. 
Therefore, we have to apply some variant of this method that avoids such outcomes. Let 
us call the “vertical restriction of the majority method” (VMD) the judgment-relational 
aggregation function F that asigns to every profile of individual judgment relations f= 
=(R1,…, Rn) in its domain the aggregate relation RV such that for every two propositions 
p and q in the agenda, pRVq iff, (a) ïN(p,q),fï³ïN (q,p),fïand (b) q =~p (and  p =~q). As is 
obvious, RV compares only complementary propositions, that is, if pRVq or qRVp, then q 
=~p (and  p =~q). 
 
If, on the contrary, individual judgment relations are levelled, peculiarities in 
understanding and in applying the majority method increase. The following example 
illustrates this point. 
Table 3.1 
 Proposition p Øp q Øq 
Person 1 T F T F 
Person 2 T F T F 
Person 3 F F T F 
Majority T F T F 
 
According to table 3.1, the propositions p and q are equally valued as “true” or equally 
“accepted” at the aggregate level. However, according to the notion of majority method 
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that is usual in social choice theory, proposition q must be considered higher placed 
than p (insofar as being true or accepted reveals a higher level than being false or 
rejected).  Specifically, pP1,2Øp, qP1,2Øq, ØpP3p and qP3Øq. So, it is natural to assume 
that qP3p. But then, ïN(p,q)ï=0, ïN(q,p)ï=1, and qPJp. Therefore, if it is understood that 
two collectivelly “accepted” judgments are “equally accepted” or “equally firmly 
accepted”, then the majority method has to be modified accordingly. 
 
Let us call the “levelled variant of the mayority method” (LMD) the judgment relational 
aggregation function F that assigns to every profile of individual judgment relations f= 
=(R1,…, Rn) in its domain the aggregate relation RL such that  
(a) for every two complementary propositions p and ~p in the agenda,  
pRL~p iff ïN(p,~p),fï³ïN (~p,p),fï; and 
(b) for every propositions p and q in the agenda such that p¹~q (and, hence, ~p¹q),  
(b.1) if pPL~p and qPL~q, then pILq and ~pIL~q; 
(b.2) if pPL~p and qIL~q, then pPLq; 
(b.3) if pIL~p and qIL~q, then pILq and ~pIL~q. 
 
What differences might arise if the majority method is applied to profiles of individual 
judgment levelled relations instead of being applied to its levelled variant? This 
question is approached below.  
 
.- Some properties of the majority method and its variants. 
 
As it is well known, the majority method and its levelled variant (LMD) meet several 
desirable properties. Let us denote by U the set of all of the complete, transitive and 
vertically balanced relations that can be defined on G. In addition, let UT be the subset 
of U that includes exactly all the relations in U which satisfy the tertio excluso 
principle. 
 
If the individual relations are taken from U or UT, MMD and LMD both hold two of the 
known conditions postulated in May’s theorem, namely, anonimity12 and neutrality13. 
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They also meet most of the known conditions of Arrow’s theorem; specifically, they 
satify unanimity,14 and independence of irrelevant alternatives15, the latter property 
being a formal consequence of neutrality.  
 
It is worth noticing that, in argumental situations such as those exemplified by the 
doctrinal paradox or the discursive dilemma, independece of irrelevant alternatives 
avoids the possibility of changing the outcome by altering the agenda. In general, if any 
two agendas include some subset S of propostions, and MMD or LMD is applied to S, 
then for any profile fÎ Un, the restriction of RL to S is the same in both cases (on 
agenda manipulation, cf. Dietrich 2006: 288-9). 
 
If the aggregation domain is “large enough”, both methods also satisfy non-
dictatorship16 and non-oligarchy.17 
 
The majority method also meets positive responsiveness 18 and the (strong) Pareto 
condition.19 LMD does not. In terms of responsiveness, LMD  satisfies only non-
                                                                                                                                               
12 A relational judgment aggregation function F holds anonimity iff  for every two profiles f’=(R1,…, Rn), 
f” =(Rr (1),…, Rr (n))ÎDom(F), where r:{1,…,n}®{1,…,n} is any permutation of the individuals, F(f’) = 
F(f”). 
 
13 A relational judgment aggregation function F holds neutrality iff For every two profiles f’=(R’1,…, 
R’n), f” =(R”1,…, R”n)ÎDom(F), and every p
1, p2, p3 p4ÎG,  
if for every iÎN, (p1R’i p
2 syss p3R”i p
4) and (p2R’i p
1 syss p4R”ip
3), 
then, (p1R’ p2 syss p3R” p4) and ((p2R’ p1 syss p4R”p3). 
 
14 A relational judgment aggregation function F holds unanimity iff for every profile f=(R1,…, Rn), and 
every p, qÎG, if for every individual iÎN, pPiq, then pP
Fq. 
 
15 A relational judgment aggregation function F holds independence of irrelevant alternatives iff for 
every two profiles f’=(R’1,…, R’n), f” =(R”1,…, R”n)ÎDom(F), and every p, qÎG, if for every iÎN , 
(pR’i q syss pR”i q), then (pR’ q syss pR”q). 
 
16 A relational judgment aggregation function F holds non-dictatorship iff there is no individual k  such 
that for every profile f=(R1,…,  Rn) and every p, qÎG, if pPkq, then pP
F q. 
 
17 It is als o easily shown that with MMD or LMD there is nobody with veto power. A person h has veto 
power iff for every profile f=(R1,…, Rn) and every p, qÎG, if pPhq, then not qPp. In turn, that implies that 
there is no oligarchy, where an oligarchy is any group of individuals N’ such that for every profile 
f=(R1,…,  Rn), and every p, qÎG, (a) if for every iÎN’ it happens that pPiq, then pP
Fq; and (b) every jÎN’ 
has veto power. 
 
18 A relational judgment aggregation function F holds positive responsiveness iff for every two profiles 
f’=(R’1,…,  R’n), f” =(R”1,…,  R”n)ÎDom(F), and every p, qÎG,  
if it happens that (1) for every individual iÎN, if pI’i q then pR”i q, and if pP’i q then pP”i q, 
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negative responsiveness.20 The following table illustrates how and why this method may 
fail to hold positive responsiveness.  
 
Table 3.2 
 p/f q/f  p/f’ q/f’ 
Person 1 T T  T T 
Person 2 T T  T T 
Person 3 F F  T F 
LMD T T  T T 
 
Similarly, instead of  meeting the (strong) Pareto condition, LMD satisfies only its 
vertical version, which becomes also the vertical version of unanimity when individual 
judgment relations satisfy the tertio excluso principle. 21 The following table illustrates 
how and why LMD may fail to meet the (strong) Pareto condition. 
 
Table 3.3 
  
Person 1 pP1q 
Person 2 pI2q 
Person 3  pI3q 
LMD pILq 
 
In addition, even when operating in the domain Un, LMD always generates an aggregate 
judgment relation RL that is complete, transitive, vertically balanced and levelled, and 
such that PL is asymmetrical and IL reflexive and symmetrical. As far as trantitivity is 
                                                                                                                                               
and (2) for some individual jÎN, pI’j q and pP”j q, or, qP’j p and pR”j q, 
then, if pI’ q  then pP”q.  
 
19 A relational judgment aggregation function F holds the strong Pareto condition  iff for every profile 
f=(R1,…,  Rn) in its domain and every p, qÎG, if for every individual pRiq and for some of them pPjq, 
then pPq. 
 
20 If  the expression “pR”i q” replaces “pP”i q” in the last line of the positive responsiveness formulation, 
the resulting property is called non-negative responsiveness. For obtaining the vertical versions of both, it 
suffices to substitute ~ p for q. 
 
21 For obtaining the vertical version of the (strong) Pareto condition it suffices to substitute ~ p for q. 
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concerned, this performance contrasts with that of MMD. It is well known that when 
aggregating preferences MMD may generate aggegate relations that are not even 
acyclical, though they are always complete.22 If its domain of aggregation is Un or UTn, 
MMD performs similarly. 
 
With regard to VMD within the domain Vn or VTn, it should be noted that RV links only 
complementary propositions. Consequently, within the domain Vn, RV is only vertically 
complete and satifies vacuously transitivity and vertical balance. VMD also meets 
anonimity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, positive responsiveness, 
unanimity, and the strong Pareto condition. It should be borne in mind, however, that as 
far as the comparisons of non-complementary propositions is concerned, these 
properties are vacuously satisfied. VMD also meets non-dictatorship and non-
oligarchy.23  
 
VMD may be also applied to the profiles of  individual relations in Un. In this case, RV 
satisfies only the vertical versions of neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, 
positive responsiveness, unanimity and the strong Pareto condition, non-dictatorship 
and non-oligarchy. These last two properties, however, are met in a trivial way. Imagine 
any profile such that for some individual pPiq for a pair of non-complementary  
propositions in the agenda. By definition, pPVq is not possible, because since p and q 
are non-complementary, neither pRVq, nor qRVp. So nobody can be a dictator, but for 
the wrong reasons. Let us say that k is a vertical dictator for the aggregation function F 
if for every profile and any pair of complementary propositions p and ~p in the agenda, 
if pPi~p, then pPF~p. It can be easily checked that applying VMD avoids the existence 
of vertical dictators. Similarly, VMD also meets the analogous condition of non-
oligarchy.  
 
                                                 
22 A relation R  is acyclical on the agenda G if for any sequence p1, p2,…, pn such that piPpi+1, it happens 
that p1Rpn. 
 
23 This is the reason why it may be meaningful to define the appropriate notions of dictatorship and 
oligarchy. A vertical dictator imposes his point of view at the collective level when he chooses a 
proposition against its complementary proposition. The correponding property may be called non-vertical 
dictatorship . RV also satisfies this new property and the analogous non-vertical oligarchy. 
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In addition, since there can be ties between the individuals that accept and those that 
reject any (non logically contradictory) proposition, the aggregate relations generated by 
applying MMD or LMD or VMD do not meet the tertio excluso principle (even if 
individual relations do) if the aggregation domain is large enough. It should also borne 
in mind that the majority method and its variants are not strategy-proof. 
 
.- The net majority method. 
 
Even if the individual judgment relations are vertically restricted, there is an 
aggregation procedure, also based on the numbers of individuals supporting each 
judgment, which conveys richer information than the two former variants of the 
majority method. 
 
Let us call the “net majority function” the function d(p |f) that, given any profile of 
individual judgment relationships f= (R1,…, Rn), attaches to any proposition in the 
agenda the difference between the number of individuals for which pPi ~p minus the 
number of individuals for which ~pPi p. In symbols, d(p|f)= ïN(p,~p),fï-ïN (~p,p),fï.  
 
The net majority function induces the net majority relation: for every p,qÎG, pRSq iff 
d(p|f)= d(q|f). We denote as NMMD (net majority method) the aggregation function 
that is based on the net majority function and generates the net majority relation. 
 
If the aggregation domain is Vn, VTn or any subset of one of them, NMMD conveys  
information no t supplied by VMD, namely, whether the net number of individuals 
supporting a judgment is higher, equal or lower than the net number of individuals 
supporting an other judgment. It should be noted also that RS is complete (not only 
vertically complete), transitive and vertically balanced, whether its domain is a subset 
of Un, UTn, Vn or of VTn.24 In addition, NMMD satifies anonimity, neutrality, positive 
responsiveness, unanimity, the (strong) Pareto condition, independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, non-dictatorship, and there is nobody with veto power: therefore, NMMD 
                                                 
24 With regard to the property of vertical balance, as it obvious, ïN(p,~p),fï-ïN (~p,p ),fï= (-1) [ïN (~p,p ),fï - 
ïN(p,~p),fï]. Therefore, ïN(p,~p),fï-ïN (~p,p ),fï³ ïN (q,~q),fï-ïN (~q,q ),fï, iff, ïN (~q,q ),fï- ïN (q,~q),fï ³ ïN (~p,p ),fï - 
-ïN(p,~p),fï.  
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is non-oligarchical. And as is obvious, RS does not usually meet levelling or the tertio 
excluso principle. 
 
But the most salient novelties concerning NMMD and MMD arise when the 
aggregation domain is ULn or UTLn (or any subset of one of them), where UL is the set 
of all the levelled relations in U and, similarly, UTL is the set of all the levelled relations 
in UT. In those cases, NMMD conveys the same information as within Vn and VTn, and 
also satisfies the above properties. It is more informative than LMD, and meets a more 
satisfactory set of properties than this latter variant of the majority method. 
 
Furthermore, it can be easily shown that in those aggregation domains, MMD also 
satisfies all of the above properties. In particular, RJ is always complete and transitive. 
This means that for every profile of complete, transitive, vertically balanced and 
levelled individual judgment relations, RJ is complete and transitive,  and well-known 
difficulties like the voting paradox disappear. The reason is very simple: if the 
aggregation domain is ULn or UTLn or any subset of one of them, then RJ= RS, that is, 
MMD and NMD always generates the same aggregate relation. 25 
                                                 
25 .- CLAIM 4.1.- If individual relations of categorical judgments are levelled, that is, if the domain for 
MMD and for NMMD is An or any subset of it,  
then for every profile f  and every p, qÎG,  pRSq iff pRJ q, i.e.  
ïN(p,~p),fï-ïN (~p,p ),fï=ïN(q,~q),fï-ïN (~q,q ),fïiff ïN(p,q ),fï³ïN (q,p),fï. 
 
PROOF.- Let N(r),(s),f = {iÎN : rPi ~r and sPi ~s}, that is, the set of all the persons who accept both 
propositions r and s. Then, because Ri satisfies the tertio excluso principle , 
N(p,~p),f= N(p),(q),f È N(p),( ~q),f ; N(~p, p ),f= N(~p),( ~q),f È N(~p),(q),f ; 
N(q,~q),f= N(p),(q),f È N(~p),( q ),f ; and N(~q, q ),f= N(~p),( ~q),f È N(p),( ~q),f ; 
 
Let us prove first that: 
(1.1) ifïN(p,~p),fï-ïN (~p,p ),fï= ïN (q,~q),fï-ïN (~q,q ),fï, then ïN(p),(~q),fï=ïN(~p),(q),fï; 
(1.2) if ïN(p),(~q),fï=ïN(~p),(q),fï, thenïN(p,~p),fï-ïN  (~p,p ),fï= ïN (q,~q),fï-ïN  (~q,q ),fï; 
(2.1) if ïN(p,~p),fï-ïN  (~p,p ),fï>ïN (q,~q),fï-ïN (~q,q ),fï, then ïN(p),(~q),fï>ïN(~p),(q),fï; 
(2.2) if ïN(p),(~q),fï>ïN(~p),(q),fï, then ïN(p,~p),fï-ïN (~p,p ),fï>ïN (q,~q),fï-ïN  (~q,q ),fï. 
 
For 1. - By definition, ïN(p),(q),f ÈN(p),( ~q),fï-ïN(~p),( ~q),f ÈN(~p),(q),fï= 
=ïN(p),(q),f ÈN(~p),( q ),fï-ïN(~p),( ~q),f ÈN(p),( ~q),f ï. Hence, ïN(p),(~q),f ï-ïN(~p),( q),f ï= 
=ïN(~p),( q ),f ï- ïN(p),(~q),f ï. Therefore, ïN(p),(~q),f ï=ïN(~p),( q ),f ï (and viceversa/ vice versa). 
 
For 2.1.- By definition, ïN(p),(q),f ÈN(p),( ~q),fï-ïN(~p),( ~q),f ÈN(~p),(q),fï> 
>ïN(p),(q),f ÈN(~p),( q ),fï-ïN(~p),( ~q),f ÈN(p),( ~q),f ï. Hence, ïN(p),(q),f ÈN(p),( ~q),fï+ 
+ïN(~p),( ~q),f ÈN(p),( ~q),f ï>ïN(p),(q),f ÈN(~p),( q ),fï+ïN(~p),( ~q),f ÈN(~p),(q),fï. Hence, ïN(p),(~q),fï+ïN(p),( ~q),f ï> 
ïN(~p),( q ),fï+ïN(~p),(q),fï. Therefore, ïN(p),(~q),fï> ïN(~p),( q ),fï (and vice versa). 
 
It should be noted also that:  
(a) ïN(p,q ),sï = ïN(q,p ),sï, iff, ïN(p),(~q),fï=ïN(~p),(q),fï; and 
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To sum up, let us imagine first that the aggregation domain is Bn, and that therefore, 
individual relations are segmented and categorical, and let us imagine also that VMD is 
applied. In this framework, RV is vertically complete, (vacuously) transitive, and 
vertically balanced. In addition, VMD satisfies anonimity, neutrality, independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, positive responsiveness, unanimity, the Pareto condition, non-
dictatorship and non-oligarchy. It should be noted, however, that with regard to the 
comparisons of non-complementary propositions, VMD satisfies these properties 
vacuously. 
 
In the same domain Bn, NMMD conveys a richer information than VMD does. It also 
satisfies all those properties, and RS is always complete, (non-vacuously) transitive and 
vertically balanced. It should also be noted that since RS compares every pair of 
propositions, it always holds the above aggregation properties in a non-vacuos way. 
 
If, on the contrary, the individual relations are levelled and categorical and the 
aggregation domain is An, MMD and NMMD are both more informative methods than 
LMD, both always induce the same aggregate relation; this aggregate relation is always 
complete, transitive and vertically balanced; and both methods hold a very satisfactory 
set of aggregation properties (the same as NMMD meets when its domain is Bn). LMD 
also holds these properties, except positive responsiveness. It meets non-negative 
responsiveness instead. 
 
However, the performance of these methods finds an seemingly decisive limit. As the 
following table shows, preplexing situations like the discursive dilemma may be 
generated applying any of the four former procedures: the aggregate outcome on a 
conjunction such as (pÙq) may be its rejection, while its components are both accepted 
at the aggregate level. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(b) ïN(p,q ),sï > ïN(q,p ),sï, iff, ïN(p),(~q),fï>ïN(~p),(q),fï. 
 
Given that Ri is a levelled preordering, for every iÎN(p),(~q),f, pPiq;  
for every jÎN(~p),( q ),f, qPjp; and for every hÎN(p),( q ),fÈ N(~p),(~q),f, pIhq. 
Hence, ïN(p),(~q),fï= ïN(p,q ), fï and ïN(~p),( q ),fï= ïN(q,p ), fï. The rest is obvious. Q.E.D. 
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Table 3.4 
 p Q (pÙq) 
Person 1 T T T 
Person 2 T F F 
Person 3 F T F 
VMD, LMD and MMD T T F 
SMD 1; T 1; T -1; F 
 
In other words, the aggregate relations RV, RL, RJ and RS generated respectively by 
VMD, LMD, MMD and NMMD may fail to hold set-wise deductive closure and, 
therefore, LMD, MMD and NMMD may fail also to hold set-wise deductive transfer, 
even if individual judgment relations hold these logical constraints. 
 
4.- THE ROLE OF LOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
The discursive dilemma is a specific impossibility. It has inspired other more general 
impossibility results that theorem 1 presented by List and Pettit (2002: 100) may 
exemplify.26  
 
We will offer a version of this theorem in our terms to illustrate the role played by each 
restriction in these impossibility results. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
individual and the aggregate judgment relations are segmented.  
 
List and Pettit consider that judgment aggregation functions assign to each profile of 
individual points of view a collective or aggregate set of judgments of the same kind as 
individual sets. Thus, if the domain of the aggregation function F is the set Bn of all the 
profiles where a vertically complete and vertically restricted relation that holds the 
tertio excluso principle, and set-wise deductive closure is associated with each 
individual, then RF= F(f) is also, for all profile fÎBn, a segmented relation categorical 
of categorical judgments that holds those same properties, i.e. F(f)ÎB.    
 
                                                 
26 Cf. Pauly and van Hees (2003),  Dietrich (2006) and  Gärdenfors (2006) for other general impossibility 
results.  
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We should remember that a relational judgment aggregation function F holds anonimity 
iff  for every two profiles f’=(R1,…, Rn), f” =(Rr(1),…, Rr(n))ÎDom(F), where 
r:{1,…,n}®{1,…,n} is any permutation of the individuals, F(f’) = F(f”).  
 
In addition, a relational judgment aggregation function F is vertically neutral iff for 
every two profiles f’=(R’1,…, R’n), f” =(R”1,…, R”n)ÎDom(F), and every p, ~p, q, 
~qÎG, if for every iÎN, (pR’i~p iff qR”i~q) and (~pR’i p iff ~qR”iq), 
then (pR’~p iff qR”~q) and (~pR’ p iff ~qR”q). 
 
We can now restate List and Pettit’s theorem thus: 
 
List and Pettit’s theorem adapted version: There is no anonimous and vertically 
neutral27 judgment aggregation function F such that Dom(F)= Bn, and such that 
F(f)ÎB for every profile fÎ Bn.28    
 
It should be noted, first, that for every anonimous and vertically neutral F and for every 
p, qÎG, if ïN(p,~p),fï=ïN (q, ~q),fï, then pRF~p iff qRF~q. Since RF satisfies the tertio 
excluso principle, there are only two possibilities: (1) pPF~p and qPF~q, or (2) ~pPFp 
and ~qPFq.29  
 
If the number N of individuals in the group is even, then there is a profile Bn  such that 
for some rÎG, ïN(r,~r),fï=ïN (r, ~r),fï. But then, if rRF~r or ~rRFr, then rPF~r and ~rPFr, 
                                                 
27 Instead of neutrality, List and Pettit postulate a different condition: systematicity. But this (last) 
condition and anonimity together entail vertical neutrality.  
 
28 For the original proof, see List and Pettit (2002: 109-10). 
 
29 To prove that if pPF~p then qPF~q, imagine that, on the contrary, pPF~p and ~qPFq. 
It should be noted first that if ïN(p,~p),fï=ïN (q, ~q),fï, then the number of individuals for which pPi
 ~p and 
~qPiq, equals the number of individuals for which ~pPi
 p and qPi~q. 
Let now f’ be a profile such that for every individual iÎN,  
if in the profile f, pPi
 ~p and qPi~q, then in the second profile f’, pP’i
 ~p and qP’i~q, 
if in the profile f, pPi
 ~p and ~qPiq, then in the profile f’, ~pP’i
 p and qP’i~q, 
if in the profile f,~pPi
 p and qPi~q, then in the profile f’, pP’i
 ~p and ~qP’iq, 
if in the profile f,~pPi
 p and ~qPiq, then in the profile f’, ~pP’i
 p and ~qP’iq. 
Anonimity entails that pP’F ~p and ~qP’Fq. But every individual evaluates q against ~q in the 
new profile f’ exactly like he evaluates p against ~p in the old profile f’. Hence, by vertical neutrality 
qP’F~ q, contradicting the former conclusion. Therefore, if pPF~p then qPF~q. By an analogous argument, 
if qPF~q then pPF~p. Q.E.D. 
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which is excluded by the asymmetry of PF. Hence, RF would be not vertically complete 
for this profile.  
 
If on the contrary, N is odd, there is a profile Bn such that in for some rÎG, ïN(p,~p),fï= 
ïN(q,~q),fï= ïN(Ø(pÙ q), (pÙ q)),fï.30 Only two cases are possible: (1) pPFØp, qPFØq, and 
Ø(pÙq)PF(pÙq), or (2) ØpPFp, ØqPFq, and (pÙq)PFØ(pÙq). In both cases RF fails to 
hold set-wise deductive closure because the set {p, q} entails the proposition  (pÙq), and 
this (last) proposition entails p and entails q. 
 
Summarizing, besides anonimity, vertical neutrality and the hypothesis made over the 
domain of F, two logical restrictions play a decisive role: the tertio excluso principle 
and set-wise deductive closure. 
 
This and similar impossibility results have been interpreted as disqualifying the majority 
method and similar “proposition-wise” aggregation procedures. Consequently, there has 
been a search for results using aggregation procedures of another kind, namely, “set-
wise” (instead of “proposition-wise”) aggregation procedures like the “premise-based 
procedure”, the best known example.31  
 
The latter  procedure is habitually illustrated in reference to some instance of the 
discursive dilemma, as in the following table. The propositions p and q are premises, the 
proposition r is the potential conclusion, and [r « (p Ù  q)] express a rule, doctrine, 
scientific law or regularity accepted as true by everybody in the group. It should be 
noted that given [r « (p Ù  q)] , the conclusion r holds only if the premises p and q hold.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 By hypothesis, G includes, at least p, q, (pÙq) and the negations of these three propositions. 
 
31 List and Pettit (2006a) make an informal survey of this kind of procedure. They talk of “propotion-
wise” supervenience for referring to those cases and procedures according to which the group judgment 
on each proposition in the agenda is a (possibly different) function of the individual judgments on that 
proposition (p. 10). On the contrary, “set-wise” supervenience means that the set of group judgments on 
all the propositions in the agenda is a (possibly different) function of the individual sets of judgments on 
(some or all o(p)f) these propostions (p. 12). 
 
 23 
Table 4.1 
 p q   [r «  (p Ù  q)] r 
Person 1 T T T T 
Person 2 T F T F 
Person 3 F T T F 
Majority T T T F 
Deductive closure    T 
 
The dilemma arises because there seem to be two alternative procedures for reaching 
the conclusion that could be attached to the group. One is that, r is rejected by a 
majority of the group, so if the group members vote on this proposition, its negation Ør 
would win. The other is that each of the premises p and q  and [r « (p Ù  q)] are 
supported by a majority of persons. Hence, if the conclusion is deductively inferred 
from the premises that are accepted by a majority of the group, r should be accepted as 
the collective conclusion. This latter procedure is the so called the “premise-based” 
procedure. As shown, it consists in choosing as the collective conclusion the option r 
that can be deductively inferred from the premises voted by a majority of individuals, i. 
e. the premises p, q and [r iff (p and q)]. 
 
This procedure can easily be generalized for any set of premises P. Dietrich (2006: 
296), for instance, generalizes it in the following way. Any set of premises P is a subset 
of the agenda such that (a) if pÎP then also ~pÎP, and (b) for each pair of 
complementary propositions in the agenda q and ~q, the set of premises P implies one 
of them. The premise-based procedure (for a set of premises P ) is the aggregation 
function F such that for each f=(R1,…, Rn)ÎDom(F), if R= F(f), then qP~ q for every q 
that is implied by the set of the premises that are each of them supported by a majority 
of individuals.32 
 
It should be noted that all such “set-wise” procedures induce collective judgments that, 
at least for some profiles of individual points of view, are different from those collective 
judgments generated by the majority method. As a consequence these procedures may 
                                                 
32 Setting aside the difficulties induced by ties, Dietrich (2006: 296), for instance, accepts by convention 
that in such cases the negated proposition should win over the asserted one. 
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attach to the group as its own collective judgments some judgments that are rejected by 
a majority of the persons in the group. 
 
The main lesson behind these impossibility and possibility results would be that “set-
wise” aggregation procedures should be employed instead of applying the disqualified 
“proposition-wise” methods like the majority method and its variants. But is this really 
a lesson that should be obeyed? Is there some way of recovering the possibility of 
employing the majority and similar methods for aggregating judgments? The majority 
method, its levelled and its restricted variants and the net majority method meet a large 
set of attractive properties and, last but not least, they are very simple to apply. In 
addition, “set-wise” aggregation procedures, as the example above illustrates, lead to a 
clearly anti- intuitive behavior. They lead to attaching to the group as part of its point of 
view collective judgments that are rejected by a majority of the group members.  
 
5.- THE LOGICAL CONSTRAINTS QUESTION 
 
.- Weakening logical constraints. 
 
Individuals can not always make a categorical judgment about each issue at stake. Let 
us imagine that a person can assign a definite probability to each of all of the segmented 
(or levelled) relations of categorical judgment that can be logically defined on the 
agenda G, and that he manages probabilities according to probability calculus. Such a 
probability distribution induces the following probability assignment p(p) to every 
proposition pÎG in the agenda: p(p) is the sum of the probabilities of all the  
categorical judgment relations for which p is true, that is, of all the categorical 
judgment relations for which pP~p. In addition, given p(p), the induced believed 
judgment relation R* may be defined in the following way: for every p, qÎG, pR*q iff 
p(p) ³ p(q). 
 
It is known that R* does not necessarily hold set-wise deductive closure, nor set-wise 
deductive transfer. If p and q are statistically or logically independent, it may happen 
that p(p)> 0.5, p(q)> 0.5, and p(pÙq)< 0.5. That would mean that pP*Øp , qP*Øq, and 
Ø(pÙq)P*(pÙq). This is the reason why we introduce below two weakened logical 
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constraints, called proposition-wise deductive closure, and weak or proposition-wise 
deductive transfer. 
 
On the other hand, if the agenda includes some set S of propostions such that p(s)= 1 or 
p(s)= 0 for all sÎS, R* satisfies set-wise deductive transfer and set-wise deductive 
closure with regard to them. To represent this, we also introduce below two additional 
conditions, labelled combined deductive closure, and combined deductive transfer. 
 
- Proposition-wise deductive closure:  
For every p, qÎG,   
if p logically entails q and qR~q or ~qRq, 
then, if pP~p then qP~q, and, if pR~p then qR~q. 
 
- Proposition-wise deductive transfer:  
For every p, qÎG,  if p logically entails q, then not pPq. 
 
By analogous arguments to that developed regarding the relationships between set-wise 
deductive closure and set-wise deductive transfer, it can be easily shown (1) that if R is 
transitive, complete, and vertically balanced, then proposition-wise deductive transfer 
implies proposition-wise deductive closure, and (2) that if R is transitive, complete, 
vertically balanced and levelled, then proposition-wise deductive closure implies 
proposition-wise deductive transfer. 
 
A salient fact regarding these two proposition-wise conditions is that they are 
transmitted to the aggregate level by every variant of the majority method. 
 
To show this, let UP be the set of all of the vertically balanced and complete 
preorderings defined on G that hold proposition-wise deductive transfer. Analogously, 
let VP be the set all of of the vertically complete and vertically balanced relations 
defined on G that hold proposition-wise deductive transfer.  
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CLAIM 5.1.- If F is LMD, MMD or NMMD, and Dom(F)Í UPn, then RF holds 
proposition-wise deductive transfer.33 
 
Corollary of Claim 5.1.- If F is LMD, MMD or NMMD, and Dom(F)= An, then RF 
holds proposition-wise deductive transfer. 
 
CLAIM 5.2.- If F is VMD or NMMD, and Dom(F)= VPn (or if F is VMD and Dom(F)= 
=UPn), then RF holds proposition-wise deductive closure.34 
 
Corollary of Claim 5.2.- If F is VMD or NMMD, and Dom(F)= Bn, then RF holds 
proposition-wise deductive closure. 
 
Let us now say that p is unanimously judged iff for every iÎN, pPi~p, or for every iÎN, 
pIi~p, or for every iÎN, ~pPip. In symbols, UN(G)= {pÎG: p is judged unanimously}, 
that is, 
UN(Gôf)+= {pÎG: for every iÎN, pPi~p}, 
UN(Gôf)~ = {pÎG: for every iÎN, ~pPip}, 
UN(Gôf)»= {pÎG: for every iÎN, pIi~p}, 
UN(Gôf)= UN(Gôf)+È UN(Gôf)~ È UN(Gôf)». 
 
Consider now the following restriction: 
 
- Collectively combined deductive transfer: For every SÍG and every pÎG,  
if for every sÎ S, sÎ UN(Gôf), then 
if {p}ÈS logically entails q, then it cannot happen that for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rPq. 
 
                                                 
 
33 PROOF of CLAIM 5.1.- Notice that if p logically entails q, then for every individual i, qRip. Hence,  
qRJp. In addition, if pPi~p, then qPi~q, and if pIi~p, then qRi~q. Thus qR
Sp, and in regard with LMD, (2) 
if pPL~p, then qPL~q, and (3) if pIL~p, then qRL~q. Then, qRLp. Q.E.D. 
 
34 PROOF of CLAIM 5.2.- Given that every Ri is vertically complete, if p logically entails q, then for 
every individual i, if pPi~p, then qPi~q, and  if pIi~p, then qRi~q. Hence, ïN(q,~q),fï³ïN (p,~p),fï. The rest is 
(even more) obvious. Q.E.D. 
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Let US be the set of all of the verticaly balanced and complete preorderings defined on 
G that hold set-wise deductive transfer.  
 
CLAIM 5.3.- If F is LMD, MMD or NMMD, and Dom(F)= USn, then RF holds 
combined deductive transfer.35 
 
The following is the corresponding version for deductive closure: 
 
- Colectively combined deductive closure: For every SÍG and every pÎG,  
if for every sÎ S, sÎ UN(Gôf), {p}ÈS logically entails q and qR~q or ~qRq, then  
if for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rP~r, then qP~q, 
and, if for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rR~r, then qR~q. 
 
Let now VS be the set all of of the vertically complete and vertically balanced relations 
defined on G that hold set-wise deductive closure.  
 
CLAIM 5.4.- If F is VMD or NMMD, and Dom(F)= VSn (or if F is VMD and Dom(F)= 
USn), then RF holds combined deductive closure.36 
 
It should also be noted that if R is transitive and complete, then combined deductive 
transfer implies combined deductive closure.37 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 PROOF of CLAIM 5.3.- For every individual i, if for some sÎ S, ~sPis, then for every individual j, 
~sPis. Then, qR
Ls, qRJs, and qRSs. Let us suppose, therefore, that for every sÎ S and every individual, sPi 
~s. In this case, given that Ri satisfies set-wise deductive transfer, if {p}ÈS logically entails q, then for 
every individual i, qRip. (The argument continues as in the proof of the Claim 5.1). 
 
36 PROOF of CLAIM 5.4.- For every individual i, if for some sÎ S, ~sPis, combined deductive closure 
holds vacuously. Let us suppose, then, that for every sÎ S and every individual, sRi ~s. In this case, given 
that Ri satisfies set-wise deductive closure, if {p}ÈS logically entails q, then for every individual i, if 
pPi~p, then qPi~q, and  if pIi~p, then qRi~q. (The argument continues as in the proof of the Claim 5.2). 
 
37 Suppose that for every sÎ S, sÎ UN(Gôf) , and {p}ÈS logically entails q. R is complete, hence qR~q 
or ~qRq on the one hand, and combined deductive transfer implies that for some rÎ{p}ÈS, qRr, on the 
other. Therefore, for transitivity of R,  if for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rP~r, then qP~q, and, if for every rÎ{p}ÈS, 
rR~r, then qR~q. Q.E.D. 
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.- Possibility results for individual categorical two -valued judgment relations.  
 
The following four possibility results are easily inferred from the former four claims, on 
aggregation procedures that take as inputs individual levelled or segmented relations of 
categorical judgments (i.e. relations in the set A, or in the set B). 
  
.- CLAIM 5.5.- There is a relational judgment aggregation function F (namely, VMD), 
such that (1) Dom(F)= Bn (or Dom(F)= An);  
(2) for every for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) is vertically complete, vertically 
restricted, (vacuously) transitive, and (vacuously) vertically balanced, 
(3) F is anonimous, neutral, independendent of irrelevant alternatives, positive 
responsive, unanimous, (strongly) paretian, non-dictatorial and non-oligarchical, 
(4) and every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) satisfies proposition-wise deductive closure 
and combined deductive closure. 
 
.- CLAIM 5.6.- There is a relational judgment aggregation function F (namely, 
NMMD), such that:  
(1) Dom(F)= Bn, 
(2) for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) is complete, (vacuously transitive, and 
vertically balanced, 
(3) F is anonimous, neutral, independendent of irrelevant alternatives, positive 
responsive, unanimous, (strongly) paretian, non-dictatorial and non-oligarchical, 
(4) and for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) satisfies proposition-wise deductive 
closure and combined deductive closure. 
 
.- CLAIM 5.7.- There is a relational judgmente aggregation function F (namely, LMD), 
such that: 
(1) Dom(F)= An, 
(2) for every for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) is complete, transitive, levelled and 
vertically balanced, 
(3) F is anonimous, neutral, independendent of irrelevant alternatives, non-negative  
responsive, unanimous, non-dictatorial and non-oligarchical, 
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(4) and for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) satisfies proposition-wise deductive 
closure and proposition-wise deductive closure with unanimity. 
 
.- CLAIM 5.8.- There is a relational judgment aggregation function F (namely, MMD 
and NMMD), such that: 
(1) Dom(F)= An, 
(2) for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) is complete, transitive, and vertically 
balanced: (,) 
(3) F is anonimous, neutral, independendent of irrelevant alternatives, positive 
responsive, unanimous, (strongly) paretian, non-dictatorial and non-oligarchical, 
(4) and for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) satisfies proposition-wise deductive 
closure and proposition-wise deductive closure with unanimity. 
 
.- Which logical constraints are to be met? 
 
These results show the decisive role played by the strong logical restrictions imposed on 
aggregation functions in deriving the impossibility theorems obtained in the judgment 
aggregation literature. This raises the question whether those restrictions are so 
compelling. Might they, on the contrary, be avoided or, at least, weakened as we have 
done? 
 
.- Deductive transfer and deductive closure. 
 
A typical feature of the literature is to consider that strong restrictions like set-wise 
deductive closure and set-wise deductive transfer are completely compelling. List and 
Pettit (2002: 95), for instance, make them the measuring rod of rationality in judgment 
making and in judgment aggregation, and Dietrich (2006:293) calls the corresponding 
condition “collective rationality”. Pauly and van Hees (2003: 3), to give another 
example, view logical consistency restrictions as more fundamental than contraints on 
individual preferences.  
 
Nevertheless, as shown above, those restrictions go too far in the case of a person 
managing his beliefs according to the probability calculus. I contend that this sort of 
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behavior is perfectly rational, not only when people may make quantitative probability 
judgments, but also when, being only able to make comparisons of reliability or 
likelihood, they follow the qualitative restrictions derived from the theory of probability 
when making such judgments. What notion of rationality would forbid this sort of 
epistemic behavior?   
 
It is true that the strong logical restrictions generate impossibility results when, instead 
of being imposed on individuals, they are required from the aggregation precedures. 
They mainly restrain the behavior of the group. But we do not see any clear justification 
for imposing on groups more stringent logical restrictions than those that might 
reasonably be imposed on individuals.  
 
If there are no disagreements inside the group and if individuals obey strong logical 
constraints in making judgments, the majority method guarantees that the group also 
displays this sort of strongly or set-wise consistent behavior. But what if the members of 
the group disagree, so that aggregation cannot proceed by unanimity? Again, we do not 
see any clear justification for imposing more stringent logical restrictions on groups, 
especially when their members disagree, than on individuals who have doubts or who 
are not certain about the truth or the falsehood of their beliefs and judgments.  
 
In addition, imposing set-wise logical restrictions on judgment aggregation procedures 
leads one to reject the majority method and similar mechanisms, and to accept some of 
the so called “set-wise procedures”, like the “premise-based” one. These procedures, in 
turn, lead one to include as part of the group’s collective point of view judgments that 
are rejected by a majority of its members. This sort of behavior seems clearly unnatural 
when aggregating judgments.38 In addition, the possibility results given above suggest 
that this behavior may lack the justification usually supposed for it. Given those results, 
the question is now whether substituting the combined logical restrictions for the 
corresponding set-wise variants is a more or less justified option than assigning to the 
group as its own collective judgments positions that the majority of the group members 
                                                 
38 When aggregating preferences, things may be different. It may happen, for instance, that (some) justice, 
equity or similar notions, critera or features are considered relevant for the aggregate outcome. On the 
other hand, analysis that focus on the properties of some aggregation methods shoud be distinguished 
from analysis of the choice of such methods. On this latter framework, see Zamora (2006).  
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reject. We suggest that this latter way of doing it is far more unnatural than 
implementing the substitution. 
 
In conclusion, we contend that it is plainly plausible to relax the logical restrictions that 
are habitually required from judgment aggregation functions, and replace them with 
conditions such as proposition-wise deductive closure, combined deductive closure, 
proposition-wise deductive transfer and combined deductive transfer with unanimity. It 
should be noted, on the one hand, that these less demanding conditions are met by 
individuals who behave according to the rules of probability or likelihood. If this 
weakening of logical restrictions were rejected, the group’s collective point of view 
would include judgments that are rejected by a majority of its component persons.  
 
Something similar may be said about the tertio excluso restriction. Any individual is 
allowed to doubt and assign the same probability to a proposition as to its negation. 
Why is this possibility forbidden for groups? 
 
In the literature on the aggregation of judgments it is frequently remarked that 
judgments are answers to yes or no questions, or yes or no assertions, and that in 
contrast with beliefs, they do not admit degrees. But whatever the proposed 
characterization of judgments, it is an indisputable fact that many judgments made by 
persons express only beliefs and are only supported by those persons as beliefs. The act 
of expressing a judgment may be a yes or no act, but this does not imply that the 
involved person feels himself sure or certain enough to think that it is true. He may 
think, for instance, that it is more likely or more reliable than its negation. This would 
be a good reason to accept the judgment or proposition and reject its negation, as least 
until better information is available.  
 
Of course, this does not exclude paying attention to judgments that are backed by true 
propositions or by categorical convictions. But in the case of judgments dealt with as 
true assertions, it seems unreasonable to postulate in addition that such judgments are 
always made, whatever the question. In more formal terms, in such a case judgment sets 
or judgment relations should not be assumed always as vertically complete.     
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6.- INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENTS BASED ON BELIEFS. 
 
The final considerations in the preceeding section support as plausible the idea that 
aggregate judgment relations may not obey the tertio excluso principle. In this way, a 
tie seems to be the natural outcome when the group’s members points of view are 
divided, for instance, in half. As it has been emphazised above, this eventuality is 
habitually excluded in the specialized literature. However, it is an analogous situation to 
that of a person who assigns the same probability to the ocurrence and to the non 
ocurrence of an event. 
 
But reasons of the same sort suggest the relevance of considering how judgments may 
be aggregated when individual judgments express only beliefs, rather than categorical 
convictions. Individuals can cannot habitually make a categorical judgment about every 
issue at stake. Bearing this frequent situation in mind, let us introduce relations which 
allow individuals to make judgments at diferent levels of support, likeness, reliability, 
or truth, the latter being the case of Pauly and van Hees (2003: 3), who  generalize the 
habitual judgment aggregation framework introducing the use of many-valued logic. 
‘Since t [the number of truth values] may be larger than 2, we allow individuals as well 
as the group as a whole to express degrees of acceptance and rejection’.  
 
This can be done in different ways depending on the available information about the 
categorical character of individual judgments. 
 
.- Aggregating individual segmented relations of non-categorical judgments. 
 
Imagine first that individuals are not certain about some of the issues at stake, but it is 
not known on which issues they can make a categorical judgment, and on which they 
cannot. Assuming that individual judgment relations are vertically complete, vertically 
restricted and hold proposition-wise deductive closure offers a way of formally 
representing this kind of situation. But then, Claim 5.2 tells us that if the aggregation 
domain is VPn (the set of all the segmented relations of non-categorical judgments) or 
any its subsets, the aggregate relation RV generated by VMD, and the analogous relation 
RS induced by NMMD both hold proposition-wise deductive closure. Hence, new 
possibly results, for this kind of case can be formulated and easily checked:    
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.- CLAIM 6.1.- There exists a relational judgment aggregation function F (namely, 
VMD), such that (1) Dom(F)= VPn, 
(2) for every for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) is vertically complete, vertically 
restricted, (vacuously) transitive, and (vacuously) vertically balanced, 
(3) F is anonimous, neutral, independendent of irrelevant alternatives, positive 
responsive, unanimous, (strongly) paretian, non-dictatorial and non-oligarchical: (,) 
(4) (and) every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) satisfies proposition-wise deductive closure. 
 
.- CLAIM 6.2.- There is a relational judgment aggregation function F (namely, 
NMMD), such that: 
 (1) Dom(F)= VPn, 
(2) for every for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) is complete, transitive, and vertically 
balanced, 
(3) F is anonimous, neutral, independendent of irrelevant alternatives, positive 
responsive, unanimous, (strongly) paretian, non-dictatorial and non-oligarchical: (,) 
(4) and for every f=(R1,.., Rn)ÎDom(F), F(f) satisfies proposition-wise deductive 
closure. 
 
It should be noted, however, that if the agenda is not exceedingly poor, the assumption 
made would not be the case. For instance, if the agenda includes a simple logical 
contradiction like (pÙØp) it does not seem easy to avoid making the assumption that 
individuals make categorical beliefs about it.  
 
.- Aggregating individual segmented relations of partitioned judgments. 
 
Imagine now that there is additional information available about the issues on which 
each individual makes a categorical judgment. For processing this new information we 
need for each individual the corresponding partition of the agenda qi =(GCi; GTi), 
where GCi is the subset of G of all the propositions and their negations about which (it 
is known or it can be assumed that) individual i makes (or is able to make) a categorical 
judgment. GTi is the subset all the propositions in the agenda and their negations about 
which individual i is only able to make a tentative or non-categorical judgment. 
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Given the partition of the agenda corresponding to individual i, Ri must hold the tertio 
excluso principle in the i-categorical part of the agenda: 
 
- Ri holds the restricted tertio-excluso principle iff  
for every pÎGCi, if pRi~p or ~pRip, then pPi~p or ~pPip. 
 
Similarly, deductive closure may be reformulated in the following terms: 
 
-  Individually combined deductive closure (given the partition qi =(GCi; GTi)): 
For every SÍG and every pÎG,  
if for every sÎ S, sÎ GCi, {p}ÈS logically entails q and qRi~q or ~qRiq, then  
if for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rPi~r, then qPi~q, 
and, if for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rRi~r, then qRi~q. 
 
Given a partition qi for each individual, the profile of the individual partitions can be 
defined as the n-tuple Q=(q1, q2,.., qn). In turn, given the profile Q=(q1, q2,.., qn), we 
denote by VQ the set of all the vertically complete and vertically restricted relations 
defined on G that, given the partition qi, hold the corresponding version of the restricted  
tertio excluso principle, and the corresponding condition of deductive closure.  
 
For realizing the analogous task in regard with the aggregate level, we first have to 
define a new sort of sets of unanimous and categorical judgments.  
 
Let us say that p is unanimously and categorically judged iff (1) pÎGCi for every iÎN, 
(2) and pPi~p for every iÎN, ~pPip or for every iÎN. In symbols, UNC(G)= {pÎG: p is 
judged unanimously and is categorical for every person}, that is, 
UNC(Gôf)+= {pÎG: for every iÎN, pÎGCi, and  pPi~p}, 
UNC(Gôf)~ = {pÎG: for every iÎN, pÎGCi, ~pPip}, 
UNC(Gôf)= UN(Gôf)+È UN(Gôf)~ . 
 
The following are the corresponding versions for the tertio excluso principle and for 
deductive closure: 
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- Aggregate restricted tertio-excluso principle (given the profile of individual partitions 
Q=(q1, q2,.., qn)): 
for every pÎ UNC(Gôf), if pRi~p or ~pRip, then pPi~p or ~pPip. 
 
- Doubly combined deductive closure (given the profile of individual partitions Q=(q1, 
q2,.., qn)): 
For every SÍG and every pÎG,  
if for every sÎ S, sÎ UNC(Gôf), {p}ÈS logically entails q and qR~q or ~qRq, then  
if for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rP~r, then qP~q, 
and, if for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rR~r, then qR~q. 
 
CLAIM 6.3.- If F is VMD or NMMD, and Dom(F)= VQn, then RF holds aggregate 
restricted tertio-excluso principle39 and doubly combined deductive closure.40 
 
In turn, this claim allows us to state two new possibility results concerning VMD or 
NMMD operating in the aggregation domain VQn that are entirely analogous to claims 
6.1 and 6.2 above. For their formulation, it is enough to substitute VQn for VPn and add 
that RV and RS satisfy the aggregate restricted tertio-excluso principle. 
 
.- Aggregating judgment regular individual relations. The voting paradox  
 reappears . 
 
Moving a step further, imagine that additional information is provided about what 
comparisons individua ls make between non-complementary propositions according 
their higher or lower likelihood or reliability, and about how they resolve them. If 
individuals make all of these comparisons, we need a complete and non- levelled 
judgment relation for representing the point of view of each person, reflecting the fact 
                                                 
39 It is obvious that RV and RS satisfy the aggregate tertio-excluso principle because if pÎ UNC(Gôf), 
then pPi~p for every individual, or ~pPip for every individual. 
 
40 The argument regarding doubly combined deductive closure is entirely analogous to that of Claim 5.4 
in the last section. 
 
 36 
that every pair of propositions p and q in the agenda, complementary or not, are 
compared by every individual, and that it may the the case that pPiq, pIiq, or qPip. 
 
Even if this is not the actual situation, analysing such points of view may be also 
relevant. Imagine that only levelled or segmented individual relations of categorical 
judgment relations can be assumed from individual points of view. The analysis of the 
potential beliefs that might underlie these relations may highlight eventual divergences 
between these relations and the underlying beliefs. 
 
Let R be a complete and vertically balanced preordering defined on G. Such a relation 
defines the following partition of the agenda qR =(GCR; GTR): GCR={pÎG : pRq for 
every qÎG, or qRp for every qÎG}; GTR= G\GCR (GR= G-GCR). 
 
Given the partition of the agenda qR, two new properties can be formulated: 
 
- Autorestricted tertio-excluso principle (given the profile of individual partitions 
Q=(q1, q2,.., qn)): 
for every pÎ GCi, if pRi~p or ~pRip, then pPi~p or ~pPip. 
 
-  Individually combined deductive transfer (given the partition qi =(GCi; GTi)): 
For every SÍG and every pÎG,  
if for every sÎ S, GCi, and {p}ÈS logically entails q,  
then it cannot be that for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rPq. 
 
Let Z be the set of all the complete and vertically balanced preorderings R defined on G 
that (given the partition qR) satisfy the autorestricted tertio excluso principle and 
combined deductive transfer, and let us call judgment general relations to all the 
relations in Z. 
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¿How do the majority method and its variants VMD and NMMD perform when 
aggregating individual relations of this last kind?41 ¿How do they behave in this more 
general setting? 
 
For an argument entirely analogous to that regarding Claim 6.3, the following similar 
claim can be stated: 
 
CLAIM 6.4.- If F is VMD and Dom(F)= Zn, then RF holds the aggregate restricted 
tertio-excluso principle and doubly combined deductive closure. 
 
Let us introduce now the corresponding version of deductive transfer for aggregate 
relations. 
 
- Doubly combined deductive transfer (given the profile of individual partitions Q=(q1, 
q2,.., qn)): 
For every SÍG and every pÎG,  
if for every sÎ S, sÎ UNC(Gôf), {p}ÈS logically entails q,  
then it cannot be that for every rÎ{p}ÈS, rPq. 
 
It is easy to check that the following claim holds. 
 
CLAIM 6.5.- If F is MMD or NMMD, and Dom(F)= Zn, then RF holds the aggregate 
restricted tertio-excluso principle and doubly combined deductive transfer. 
 
To sum up, VMD, MMD and NMMD also preserve in this setting the corresponding 
version of the weakened logical constraints.  
 
This is good news, but there is bad news coming. In this setting, VMD, and NMMD as 
well, loose much information about the individual points of view. So, applying MMD 
may be more appropriate than formerly. But, changing and extending the domain of 
                                                 
41 The levelled variant LMD of the majority method lacks a clear meaning in this new framework.  
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aggregation to Zn may lead to MMD and NMMD diverging in comparing non-
complementary propositions, as the following example shows. 
 
Table 6.1 
Person 1 pP1~p, qP1~q, qP1p. 
Person 2 pP2~p, qP2~q, qP2p. 
Person 3 pP3~p, ~qP3q, pP3q. 
MMD pPj~p, qPj~q, qPJp. 
NMMD pPS~p, qPS~q, pPSq. 
 
It should be noted that this divergence is a simple consequence of one elementary fact. 
As far as the comparisons of non-complementary propositions are concerned, MMD 
and NMMD collect and convey information of different kinds.  
 
As a consequence, with regard to the relationships between non-complemnetary 
propositions NMMD may fail to meet some properties like neutrality, independence of 
irrelevant alternatives and positive responsiveness, as the following two tables 
illustrate. 
 
Table 6.2 
Person 1 pP1~p, pI1q, qP1~q.  pP’1~p, pI’1q, qP’1~q. 
Person 2 pI2~p, pI2q, qI2~q.  pI’2~p, pI’2q, qI’2~q. 
Person 3 ~pP3p, qP3p, ~qP3q.  ~pP’3p, qP’3p, qP’3~q. 
NMMD pIS~p, qISq, qISp.  pIS’~p, qPS’p, qPS’~q. 
 
Table 6.3 
Person 1 pP1~p, pI1q, qP1~q.  pP’1~p, pP’1q, qP’1~q. 
Person 2 pP2~p, pI2q, qP2~q.  pP’2~p, pP’2q, qP’2~q. 
Person 3 ~pP3p, qI3p, ~qP3q.  ~pP’3p, qI’3p, ~qP’3q. 
NMMD pPS~p pISq qPSp.  pPS’~p, qIS’p, qIS’~q. 
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With regard to MMD, perhaps the most salient point is that the voting paradox, and 
similar phenomena, may reappear:42 
Table 6.4 
Person 1 pP1~p, ~pP1q, pP1q. 
Person 2 ~pP2p, ~pP2q, qP2p. 
Person 3 pP3~p, qP3~p, qP3p. 
MMD pPJ~p, ~pPJq, qPJp. 
 
It should be noted, in addition, that when dealing with judgments, the voting paradox 
may give rise to situations which lack logical coherence in a very elementary sense.  
 
Table 6.5 
Person 1 pP1~p, ~pP1q, pP1q, ~qP1q. 
Person 2 ~pP2p, ~pP2q, qP2p, qP2~q or ~qP2q.  
Person 3 pP3~p, qP3~p, qP3p, qP3~q or ~qP3q. 
MMD pPJ~p, ~pPJq, qPJp, qPJ ~q or ~qPJ q. 
 
In this example, qPJp while pPJ~p. Elementary coherence (and vertical balance) would 
require both that pPJ~q and ~pPJ~q, or at least, pPJ~q, and qPJ~q and not ~pPJ q. 
Nevertheless, ~pPJ q and it may be the case that ~qPJ q. 
 
.- Many truth-values 
 
It has been mentioned above thet Pauly and van Hees (2003) generalize the judgment 
aggregation habitual framework introducing the use of many-valued logic. Complete 
and vertically balanced preorderings satisfying set-wise deductive transfer may 
represent in our terms many individual truth-valued points of view. Let H be the set of 
all such relations.  
                                                 
42 The following table illustrates how the voting paradox disappears when individual judgment relations 
are categorical. 
Person 1 pP1~p, ~pI1q, pP1q. 
Person 2 ~pP2p, ~pP2q, qI2p. 
Person 3 pP3~p, qP3~p, qI3p. 
MMD pPJ~p, ~pPJq, qPJp. 
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Of course, the difficulties regarding the fulfilment of the set-wise logical constraints at 
the aggregate level, as those exemplified by the discursive dilemma, return. However, 
applying Claim 5.3 it is easy to show that if F  is NMMD or MMD and Dom(F)= Hn, 
then the aggregate judgment relation always satisfies collective combined deductive 
transfer and, therefore, combined deductive closure. Similarly,  applying Claim 5.4 it is 
easy to show that if F is VMD and Dom(F)= Hn, then the aggregate judgment relation 
always satisfies collective combined deductive closure.   
 
However, difficulties like those presented in the preceeding section regarding NMMD 
and MMD are not avoided in this new domain, because they are originated 
independently from which logical constraints are postulated or satisfied.  
 
.- Summing degrees of support 
 
Finally, imagine that the degrees of support (siÎ[0,1]) which individuals attach to each 
of their judgments are known, and that the degrees support from different individuals 
are considered interpersonally comparable. Given a proposition p we can calculate its 
aggregate degree of support s(p)= åiÎNsi(p) as the sum of all the individual degrees of 
support. In addition, given the aggregate degree of support of each proposition in the 
agenda, we can compare such propositions as we would apply the utilitarian criterion, 
pRUq iff s(p)³ s(q), giving rise to a new aggregate judgment relation with the same 
good formal properties as the utilitarian aggregate function.  
 
If this procedure is possible and meaningful, RU avoids the above difficulties with MMD 
and NMMD when individual relations are regular relations of categorical or of non-
categorical judgments. But at the same time, it can happen that a collective judgment 
obtained by the majority method or by any of its variants is changed if the degrees of 
support  summing method is applied. Suppose, for instance, that si(p)= 0.6 for i= 1, 2, 
3, and that sj(Øp)= 1 for j= 4, 5. Then, applying VMD, or LMD, or MMD or NMMD, 
we obtain that pRFØp, while summing the degrees of support we have that ØpPUp. This 
example and the analysis made in this paper show how heavily the choice of the 
appropriate judgment aggregation method and the outcome reached in each case depend 
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on the information available about the judgments that individuals hold and the firmness 
that they attach to them.   
 
7.- AGGREGATING JUDGMENTS OR ARGUMENTS? 
 
In principle, aggregating individual judgments is a task not restricted to any kind of 
individual judgment. But the existing literature on aggregating judgments habitually 
focuses on the agregation of interconnected judgments such as, in the simplest cases, 
“reasons” or “premises” on the one hand, and “conclusions” or “outcomes” on the other. 
In other words, the habitual framework would be not so much focused on aggregating 
judgments, as on aggregating arguments and their potential conclusions.43 But if this is 
the case, then problems and situations of this sort may be set up in a much simpler way. 
In addition, setting up such problems and situations in this simpler way avoids 
difficulties like those analysed in the preceeding pages. 
 
Imagine that according to a scientific law, if phenomenon a and phenomenon b both 
take place, then and only then an event c will occur. What should be asked of a single 
scientist on his opinion about the possibility of event c?  
 
Table 7.1 
a b Øa Øb (aÙb) (aÙØb) (ØaÙb) (ØaÙØb) [(aÙb) «c] c Øc 
0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2  0.4 0.4 0 1 0.2 0.8 
 
There are four relevant states of the world: [a; b; (and then c)]; [a; not b; (and then not 
c)];  [not a; b; (and then not c)];  [not a; not b; (and then not c)]. If asking the scientist 
on the conjunction (aÙb), his answer gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
expecting c or for expecting not c. If however, we ask about  a separately, we are asking 
his position about a and not a, that is, between the possibility that the state [a; b; (and 
then c)] or the state [a; not b; (and then not c)] occurs, and the possibility that the state 
[not a; b; (and then c)] or the state [not a; not b; (and then not c)] occurs. If we ask 
about b separately, an analogous situation occurs. Therefore, if he is not certain, he may 
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answer for a and for b. But this means only that he thinks that the eventuality that the 
state [a; b; (and then c)] or the state [a; not b; (and then not c)] occurs is more likely 
than the possibility that the state [not a; b; and then c)] or the state [not a; not b; (and 
then not c)] occurs, and similarly with regard to the possiblility of state [a; b; (and then 
c)] or state [not a; b; (and then not c)] against the possibility of state [a; not b; and then 
c)] or state [not a; not b; (and then not c)]. In any case, it does not follow that c will 
occur, nor that its ocurrence is more likely than its non-occurrence. As shown in table 
7.1, he might assign a probability higher than 0.5 to a and to b, but he might also assign 
a probablity lower than 0.5 to the joint ocurrence of a and b, thus considering (aÙb) 
improbable (aÙb), and thus considering it improbable that c.  
 
So, if the scientist is simply asked whether (a and b) or not, then we can conclude that c 
is more likely than not c if the answer is affirmative, or we can conclude that it is less 
likely if the answer is negative. But if this is the case with a single scientist, why must it 
be different when asking a committee of scientists? Why aggregate judgments on a and 
b separately? Why not ask and aggregrate judgments on (aÙb) when they must operate 
jointly to produce the possible outcome? 
 
One of the (many) possible ways of formalizing these ideas is selecting essential 
elements of the agenda or reducing the agenda to those essential elements: as we may 
say, “normalizing” the agenda.  
 
A normalized agenda G= {{p}ÈWÈ{q}} is a set {{p}ÈWÈ{q}} of propositions such 
that: 
- it contains a (possibly empty) set of propositions W,  a conjunction of premises p, and 
 a conclusion q; 
- it contains the complementary of each proposition vÎ, W of p and of q; 
- each vÎW is true for every person in the group; 
- {p}ÈW entails q. 
 
It should be noted that a normalized agenda induces a domain restriction. If Z* is the set 
of all generalized judgment relations definable on the set {{p}ÈWÈ{q}}, the 
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“normalized” or “relevant” restriction induced by G={{p}ÈWÈ{q}} is the subset of all 
the RÎZ* such that for every vÎW, vÎMax(GôR). 
 
It should be noted that for every individual i and every v, rÎW: 
the only triples s1, s2, s3ÎG  such that s1Pj s2 and s2Pj s3, are the following: 
(1) vPi q, qPi ~q, (2) vPi ~q, ~qPiq, (3) vPi p, pPi ~p, (4) vPi ~p, ~pPip, 
(5) vPi q, qPi p, (6) vPi q, qPi ~p, (7) vPi ~q, ~qPi p, (8) vPi ~q, ~qPi ~p. 
 
So, in all those cases, it cannot be that s3Pj s1. Hence, extremal restriction holds for 
every triple s1, s2, s3ÎG , and RJ is transitive (Sen, 1986: 1139).  
 
Regarding logical constraints, RJ transfers support from the argument p to the 
conclusion q. By hypotheses {p}ÈW entails q, and for every vÎW, vÎMax(GôRi) for 
every person i. Given that Ri is complete and meets combined deductive transfer, there 
is some sÎ{p}ÈW, such that qRis. If s¹p, then sÎMax(GôRi) , and sRip. For transitivity, 
qRip. Hence, qRip for every person I, and qRJ p by unanimous agreement. 
 
To sum up. If asking the relevant question and aggregating the relevant judgments, the 
discursive dilemma and related phenomena disappear. On the other hand, asking 
questions on judgments other than the relevant ones and aggregating correpondingly 
may lack a clear meaning.  
 
8.- SUMMARY AND FINAL REMARKS 
 
In this paper we have considered six scenarios depending on the available information 
on the points of view of the group’s individuals. In the most simple one, individual 
points of view are represented by relations in set B, that is, segmented relations of 
categorical judgments. In another, individual points of view are represented by relations 
in set A, that is, levelled relations of categorical judgments. We have considered also 
the possibility that individual points of view are represented by segmented relations of 
non-categorical or of partitioned judgments, with VPn and VQn respectively being the 
aggregation domain. Finally, we kept in mind the possibility that individual point of 
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view are represented by regular relations of non-categorical or categorical judgments, 
with Zn and Hn respectively being the aggregation domain. 
 
In the first case, the majority method variants that can be properly applied are the 
vertical restriction of the majority method (VMD) and the net majority method 
(NMMD). RV denotes the aggregate relations generated by the former, RS those 
generated by the latter. If, on the contrary, individual relations are levelled, in addition 
to the former two methods we can also apply the levelled variant of the majority method 
(LMD) and the majority method itself (MMD). RL denotes the aggregate relations 
generated by LMD, RJ those generated by MMD. 
 
These methods and  the aggregate relations induced by them hold many attractive 
properties. 
 
For instance, if levelled relations of categorical judgments are aggregated, RL , RJ  and 
RS are complete and vertically balanced preorderings, RL is also levelled, and RJ = RS , 
while RV  is vertically restricted and, instead of being complete, it is only vertically 
complete. RV also satisfies vertical balance but only in a vacuous way. If, on the 
contrary, the individual relations that are being aggregated are segmented relations of 
categorical or of non-categorical or of partitioned judgments, applying LMD or MMD 
becomes meaningless, and RV and RS hold the same properties as when aggregating 
profiles in set An. 
 
Let now this same set An of individual profiles be the aggregation domain. Then, LMD, 
MMD and NMMD (and VMD) hold anonimity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, non-negative responsiveness, unanimity, the vertical version of the (strong)  
Pareto condition (equivalent with unanimity in this scenario), non-dictatorship, non-
vertical-dictatorship, non-oligarchy and non-vertical-oligarchy. MMD and NMMD 
(and VMD) satisfy, in addition, positive responsiveness and the (strong) Pareto 
condition. 
 
If the aggregation domain is Bn or VPn or VQn, (that is, if individual relations are 
segmented relations of categorical, or of non-categorical or of partitioned judgments) 
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NMMD conveys the same information as when its domain is An and it also meets all the 
former properties, as does VMD as well.  
 
These facts notwithstanding, those aggregation methods are habitually disqualified 
because the tertio excluso principle and the deductive closure restriction are imposed on 
the aggregation RF. A simple example of a tie between the people who accept a 
proposition and the people who reject it suffices to show that these four method do not 
lead to the fulfilment of the tertio excluso principle. Analogously, the discursive 
dilemma illustrates how these methods can lead to a violation of set-wise deductive 
closure. 
 
In this paper it has been suggested that such restrictions may be excessive as far as they 
cannot be required from any individual who must base his judgments on beliefs. In 
particular, the tertio excluso principle should not be postulated at all, and set-wise 
deductive closure may be substitued by some weakened logical restrictions, like 
proposition-wise, combined and doubly combined deductive closure and deductive 
transfer. 
 
Specifically, we have shown that if VMD or NMMD is applied with the domain Bn, that 
is, when individual relations are segmented relations of categorical judgments, (or if 
either of the two former methods or LMD or MMD is employed with the set An, when 
individual relations are levelled relations of categorical judgments), the aggregation 
domain, then RF alwayssatisfies collective combined deductive closure (collective 
combined deductive transfer). In these cases, then, individual relations satisfy set-wise 
deductive closure (transfer), and aggregate relations hold collective combined deductive 
closure (transfer). 
 
Suppose now that individual relations are segmented relations of non-categorical 
judgments (or regular relations of non-categorical judgments), that the aggregation 
domain is VPn (or Wn) and that VMD or NMMD (or LMD or NMMD or MMD) is 
applied. In these cases, individual and aggregate relations meet proposition-wise 
deductive closure (transfer). 
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Thirdly, imagine that individual relations are segmented relations of partitioned 
judgments (or regular relations of partitioned judgments), that the aggregation domain 
is VQn (or Zn) and that VMD or NMMD (or LMD or NMMD or MMD) is applied. In 
these cases, individual combined deductive closure (transfer) and aggregate relations 
meet doubly combined deductive closure (transfer). 
 
We have defended that proposition-wise deductive closure, proposition-wise deductive 
transfer, collective combined deductive closure, collective combined deductive transfer, 
doubly combined deductive closure and doubly combined deductive transfer are logical 
constraints that may be required from groups more properly than the tertio excluso 
principle and deductive closure, save that the group’s point of view is unanimous. In 
this latter case, the former conditions and deductive closure are logically equivalent. 
Therefore, were my suggestion accepted, the majority method and its examined variants 
would be viable aggregation methods, unlike the habitual position defended in the 
literature. Specifically, it would be accepted (1) that VMD can be properly applied 
when information about individual points of view is given by individual relations of any 
of the kinds we have considered, (2) that NMMD can be properly applied and conveys 
richer information at the aggregate level than VMD (and LMD) when information about 
individual points of view is given by segmented relations of categorical or of non 
categorical judgments, or by levelled relations of categorical judgments, and (3) that 
LMD and MMD can be properly applied when information about individual points of 
view is given by levelled relations of categorical judgments, when MMD conveys just 
the same aggregate information as NMMD, being in addition more informative than 
LMD at the aggregate level.   
 
When individual relations are regular relations of categorical (domain Hn), non-
categorical (domain Wn) or partitioned judgments (domain Zn), LMD and VMD 
convey the same information as when the aggregation domain is An and each of them 
meets the same properties. Hence, they may be properly applied also in this case, 
though it would be preferable to increase the information that they supply. But with 
regard to MMD and NMMD, things are somewhat different in this case. Specifically, RJ 
is not more transitive, nor even acyclical, and does not hold vertical balance. In turn, 
while conveying the same information as in former cases, with respect to the 
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comparisons of non-complementary propositions NMMD may fail to meet properties 
like neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and positive responsiveness. 
 
These last difficulties can be avoided if individual degrees of support are known and 
interpersonally comparable, and if the method analogous to the utilitarian criterion 
method is applied. However, it should be taken into account that this method may give 
different outcomes than the majority method and its variants. These latter methods, on 
the other hand, may be applied when information about the individual points of view is 
merely qualitative. As pointed out before, these and earlier considerations suggest how 
heavily choice of the appropriate judgment  aggregation method and the outcome 
reached in each case depend on the information available about the judgments that 
individuals hold and the firmness that they attach to them.   
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